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Abstract 
This study aims to explain current regional policies 
in Japan and to explore challenges in relation to the same. 
Specifically, I will focus on regional revitalisation policies 
implemented by the Abe cabinet since 2014 and examine 
whether grants for regional revitalisation policies 
are distributed in a way that political scientists have 
disputed for a long time. From the perspective of public 
policy analyses in political science, I will conduct 
statistical analyses by using aggregated data of local 
municipalities in Japan. Thus, I will clarify the current 
status of and challenges related to regional policies 
in Japan. 
Abstrakt 
Artykuł ma na celu wyjaśnienie współczesnych kierunków 
i tendencji działań regionalnych w Japonii wraz 
z przedstawieniem towarzyszących im wyzwań. 
W szczególności, tekst uwypukla politykę rewitalizacji 
regionalnej wdrożonej przez rząd Abe w  roku 2014. 
Analizowane są także działania i decyzje związane 
z podziałami środków oraz ich zasadność naukowo-
ekonomiczna. Służyć temu będą analizy wzbogacone 
o dane statystyczne uzyskane z ośrodków japońskich. 
Pozwoli to określić współczesny status polityki oraz 
wyzwań, przed którymi w tym zakresie staje obecnie 
Japonia.  
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1. Introduction 
According to the Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport 
and Tourism, the population of Japan peaked at approximately 127.8 
million in 2005 and has begun decreasing. The ministry estimates that 
Japan’s population will reach approximately 95.2 million in 2050 1 . 
Moreover, on investigating changes of population movements in Japan 
in 2017, only the Tokyo Metropolitan Area 2  became overrun by new 
residents, about 120,000 people. In other areas, the number of residents 
moving out was more than that of people moving in. For instance, 
the Osaka Area, which was the second largest urban area in Japan 3 , 
witnessed a decrease of approximately 9,000 people 4 . In addition, 
it appears that about 58.4% of residents moving in the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Area were aged 20–24 years, and about 23.5% were aged 15–19 years 
in 2016 5 . The former generation was of people seeking employment, 
and the latter was of those enrolling in university. Thus, much 
of the younger generation moves in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area from 
all over the country to get jobs or get admitted in universities. According 
to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, 
approximately 20% of areas where people live in the present day will 
no longer be occupied by 20506. 
Owing to the aforementioned situation in Japan, regional 
revitalisation policies have been implemented alongside the second 
Abe cabinet, which took office in September 2014, and since the revised 
budget for fiscal year 2014, the Japanese government has distributed 
grants for regional revitalisation to local municipalities. 
This study aims to clarify where these grants are distributed 
and confirm whether theories of conventional distribution of grants-in-aid 
in Japan apply to grants for regional revitalisation. Local finance in Japan 
is too centralised and, thus, does not allow municipalities to be financially 
independent from the national government. Therefore, it is so difficult 
for local governments to promote their own policies without the support 
of grants-in-aid from the central government. 
 
1  Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, 
http://www.mlit.go.jp/common/000135838.pdf [access: 11 July 2018] 
2 Tokyo Prefecture, Saitama Prefecture, Chiba Prefecture and Kanagawa Prefecture. 
3 Osaka Prefecture, Kyoto Prefecture, Hyogo Prefecture and Nara Prefecture. 
4 Statistics Japan, https://www.stat.go.jp/data/idou/2017np/kihon/youyaku/index.html 
[access: 11 July 2018] 
5  Headquarter for Overcoming Population Decline and Vitalizing Local Economy 
in Japan in Cabinet Secretariat, 
https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sousei/meeting/kpi_kenshouteam/h29-10-06-
shiryou2.pdf [access: 11 July 2018] 
6  Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, 
http://www.mlit.go.jp/common/000135838.pdf [access: 11 July 2018] 
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2. Regional revitalisation policies in Japan 
Regional revitalisation policies in Japan basically aim to revitalise local 
municipalities and to solve declining population issues. Specifically, they 
present the following three points as medium- to long-term aims 
of regional revitalisation policies: 1) to realise the desires of the younger 
generation in terms of employment, marriage and child care; 2) to improve 
excessive population concentration to the Tokyo Metropolitan Area and 3) 
to resolve local problems as applicable to the characteristics 
of the concerned region. 
To this end, regional revitalisation policies in Japan are presented 
in the following five policy areas: to encourage new streams of people 
towards local areas; to create flexible jobs in local areas; to realise 
the needs of married life, birth and child care in relation to the younger 
generation; to develop the concerned areas and increase safety 
and to promote regional cooperation7. 
For instance, regional revitalisation policies in Ofunato City in Iwate 
Prefecture focus on processing and distributing low-value materials which 
have not been industrialised and high value adding materials which a catch 
of fish is too small. In addition to this, guard lodges have been established 
to interest consumers to visit fish-producing districts and interact with 
fishermen and to promote sightseeing. Owing to such regional 
revitalisation policies, Ofunato City could create flexible jobs locally 
and encourage new streams of people towards local areas8. 
Similarly, in Shiwa Town in Iwate Prefecture, the induction 
of investment was entrusted to private-sector businesses instead 
of carrying on in-house development although the town as the local 
government was the landowner. As a result, the town could established 
a base with several institutions which had the ability to attract customers 
owing to the market mechanisms pursued by private businesses and could 
raise funds for development from the market. Thus, Shiwa Town could 
not only create flexible jobs in local areas and encourage new streams 
of people towards local areas such as Ofunato City but also develop 
 
7  Headquarter for Overcoming Population Decline and Vitalizing Local Economy 
in Japan in Cabinet Secretariat, 
https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sousei/meeting/honbukaigou/h26-09-12-siryou2.pdf 
[access: 11 July 2018] 
8  Headquarter for Overcoming Population Decline and Vitalizing Local Economy 
in Japan in Cabinet Secretariat and Headquarter for Promotion of Regional Revitalization 
in Cabinet Office, 
https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sousei/pdf/chihousousei_jireisyu.pdf [access: 20 July 
2019] 
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the concerned areas, increase safety and promote regional cooperation 
because of this regional revitalisation policy9. 
3. Literature review on the distribution of grants 
Conventionally, much research exists on grants-in-aid. In political science, 
this research is normally conducted from the perspective of political 
distribution of grants. Theoretically, political scientists have argued that 
the distribution occurs in political business cycle or pork barrel politics. 
The former view theorises that politicians intervene in the economy 
for ruling parties to win national elections; the latter theorises that 
politicians distribute profits through roads, bridges, the Shinkansen 
and so on – all by means of grants-in-aid to their constituencies. 
There are several studies that explain the political distribution 
of grants-in-aid. For instance, Fujimoto et al. (1983) demonstrate political 
influence on the distribution of agricultural budget to prefectures from 
the perspective of numerous local variables and number of members 
of the Diet. Chiu (1993) has taken up a subsidy to public undertakings 
to prefectures, researched on the association of the difference of votes 
between the ruling party and opposition parties and the distribution 
of grants-in-aid and has posited that the ruling party has distributed many 
grants-in-aid to prefectures with a distinct difference between the votes 
for the ruling and the opposition parties; moreover, the weight of the votes 
was heavy. Hori (1996) showed that the number of members of the Diet 
belonging to the ruling party and the number of times they were elected 
influenced the distribution of the budget of public undertakings. 
Kobayashi (1997) has also proven that there is political noise, such 
as career points and rates of the votes of members of the Diet belonging 
to the ruling party, in terms of the distribution of grants. Doi and Ashiya 
(1997) and Doi (2000) have mentioned that many grants-in-aid 
are distributed to prefectures in which many members of the Diet are 
elected. Onizuka (1997) has analysed factors involved in the distribution 
of grants-in-aid and subsidy to prefectures and have revealed that 
the degree of a close election has come to influence this distribution since 
the beginning of the 1980s. 
However, the number of studies on the distribution of grants in Japan 
has declined since the 2000s. This decrease can be attributed to the fact 
that the condition of public finance in Japan has changed according 
to the appearance of the Koizumi cabinet, which carried out fiscal reform 
very strictly. 
 
9  Headquarter for Overcoming Population Decline and Vitalizing Local Economy 
in Japan in Cabinet Secretariat and Headquarter for Promotion of Regional Revitalization 
in Cabinet Office, 
https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sousei/pdf/chihousousei_jireisyu.pdf [access: 20 July 
2019] 
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4. Preceding studies about regional 
revitalisation policies 
Currently, there are three categories of preceding studies about regional 
revitalisation policies. The first category discusses the content of regional 
revitalisation policies in various local autonomies in Japan. For instance, 
Takayose (2015) discusses regional revitalisation policies from 
the perspective of reform of grants-in-aid. Nakayama (2016) considers 
regional revitalisation policies in relation to population decline. Kaneko 
(2016) looks at regional revitalisation policies from the perspective 
of sociology. Yaoita (2017) also discusses regional revitalisation policies 
as a package of policies. The second category introduces methods 
and cases of regional revitalisation policies in Japan. For instance, 
Hashimoto (2015) discusses methods of regional vitalisation and Nakato 
(2016) discusses methods of regional revival in depopulated areas. 
The third category focuses on international regional revitalisation policies 
such as those proposed by the Centre of Area Studies in Hosei University 
and Okamoto (2017), who describe the mechanism of regional vitalisation 
in the European Union. 
5. Research questions 
As mentioned previously, regional revitalisation policies in Japan have just 
begun to be implemented, and there have not been any macroscopic 
studies conducted on this subject thus far. Therefore, I will analyse 
the distribution of grants for regional revitalisation policies from 
a macroscopic perspective. 
This study attempts to answer the following research questions: 
Where are grants of regional revitalisation policies distributed? Does 
the distribution of grants for regional revitalisation policies apply 
to theories of preceding studies on the distribution of grants-in-aid 
in Japan? 
6. Analysis 
To answer the above research questions, I conducted a structural equation 
modelling (SEM) analysis, clarifying what kinds of factors influence 
the distribution of grants for regional revitalisation policies. In this 
analysis, I have regarded the following as the theories of previous studies 
on the distribution of grants-in-aid in Japan: 1) the worse the local finance 
trend, the more the local municipalities can be distributed grants-in-aid; 
2) the worse the social and economic trends—that is, the decreasing 
population and higher unemployment trends—the more the local 
municipalities can be distributed grants-in-aid and 3) the more the vote 
rate of ruling parties, the more the local municipalities can be distributed 
grants-in-aid. 
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Subjects of this analysis were 773 cities and 23 special wards in Tokyo 
prefecture. The dependent variable of this analysis was the amount 
of grants for regional revitalisation policies per capita10. Observational 
variables were as follows: rate of votes obtained by ruling parties 11 , 
population trend12, local finance trend13, ratio of secondary industries’ 
working population14, unemployment ratio15 and home ownership ratio16. 
 
 
Fig. 1: Results of the SEM: Model of distribution of grants for regional 
revitalisation policies 
 
10  Data from Cabinet Secretariat and Cabinet Office, 
https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sousei/about/kouhukin/index.html [access: 1 May 
2018] 
11 The percentage of the vote obtained by ruling parties in proportional representation at 
the election of the House of Representatives in 2014. Data from The Asahi Shimbun 
Company. 2014. Asahi Shimbun de Miru 2014 Sosenkyo no Subete. The Asahi Shimbun 
Company. 
12 Population in 2015/population in 2005. Data from Statistics Japan, https://www.e-
stat.go.jp/ [access: 1 May 2018] 
13 Financial index in 2015/ financial index in 2005. Data from Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communications, http://www.soumu.go.jp/iken/kessan_jokyo_2.html [access: 
1  May 2018] 
14 Data from Statistics Japan, https://www.e-stat.go.jp [access: 1 May 2018] 
15 Data from Statistics Japan, https://www.e-stat.go.jp [access: 1 May 2018] 
16 Data from Statistics Japan, https://www.e-stat.go.jp [access: 1 May 2018] 
Munenori Ichishima: Current Status of and Challenges in Regional 
Policies in Japan 
31 
Figure 1 demonstrates the analysis results. The results re-veal that 
as population decreases, local finance worsens, and at the same time, when 
the unemployment ratio is high, the amount of grants for regional 
revitalisation policies at 5% level of significance is higher. Furthermore, 
the rate of votes obtained by ruling parties positively influences grants 
but is not statistically significant at the 5% level17. 
Thus, grants for regional revitalisation policies are distributed to local 
municipalities wherein population decreases, local finance worsens 
and  the unemployment ratio is high. As a result, the distribution of grants 
for regional revitalisation policies does not apply to the theories 
of preceding studies on the distribution of grants-in-aid in Japan. 
Now, I will consider why grants for regional revitalisation policies 
do not apply to the theories of preceding studies on distribution of grants-
in-aid in Japan. Apparently, the most important reason is that 
the conditions under which the grants for regional revitalisation policies 
are applied are very severe. For instance, conditions to grant subsidies 
for regional revitalisation policies are that they have to be pioneering 
projects and have to set up objective key performance indicator(s) aiming 
at the outcome in favour of residents. 
Table 1: Distributed grants for regional revitalisation policies18 
Unit: billion yen 
Grants for 
regional 
revitalisation 
policies 
Fiscal 
year Prefectures 
Cities, towns 
and villages Total Target 
Prevenient 2014 11.0 19.3 30.3 30 
Accelerating 2015 29.6 68.9 98.5 100 
Pushing 
forward 
2016 13.1 10.6 23.8 100 
2017 6.9 8.6 15.3 100 
Developing 
bases 2016 26.0 40.3 66.3 90 
 
As a result of these conditions, it is difficult for local municipalities 
to apply for grants for regional revitalisation policies. Consequently, 
as Table 1 shows, the total amounts of grants for regional revitalisation 
policies have suddenly decreased since the introduction of pushing 
forward grants for regional revitalisation policies in the 2016 fiscal year. 
In the 2014 fiscal year, 30.3 billion yen was distributed as prevenient 
grants for regional revitalisation policies against the target grants-in-aid 
amount of 30 billion yen. In the 2015 fiscal year, 98.5 billion yen was 
 
17 This is statistically significant at 6.5% level. 
18  Data from Cabinet Secretariat and Cabinet Office, 
https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sousei/about/kouhukin/index.html [access: 1 May 
2018] 
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distributed as accelerating grants for regional revitalisation policies 
against the target amount of 100 billion yen. 
However, in the 2016 fiscal year, only 23.8 billion yen was distributed 
as pushing forward grants for regional revitalisation policies against 
a target amount of 100 billion yen. In the 2017 fiscal year, the distributed 
amount of grants was only 15.3 billion yen, although the target amount 
was 100 billion yen. Similarly, 66.3 billion yen was distributed 
as developing bases grants for regional revitalisation policies against 
the target amount of 90 billion yen in the 2016 fiscal year. 
Thus, eligibility conditions for grants for regional revitalisation 
policies are too strict for local municipalities to apply. As a result, 
the number of local municipalities applying for these grants has gradually 
decreased. Consequently, a large number of grants for regional 
revitalisation policies has not yet been distributed. Considering this, 
the grants that have not been distributed politically is a matter of course. 
Furthermore, equally important is analysing the cases of towns and 
villages in small, local municipalities. This indicates different results 
compared to those of the analysis above, as it is more difficult for small 
towns and villages to apply for these grants. In this vein, we need 
to examine what kinds of factors influence the distribution of grants 
for regional revitalisation policies. It appears that civil servant loans from 
the central government to local governments might affect applications, 
as it is difficult to apply for them as well. 
7. Conclusion 
In sum, as my statistical analysis revealed, grants for regional 
revitalisation policies are distributed to local municipalities where 
population decreases, local finances worsen and the unemployment ratio 
rises. Moreover, the distribution of grants for re-gional revitalisation 
policies does not apply to theories of preceding studies about 
the distribution of grants-in-aid in Japan; that is, they are distributed 
politically. 
However, following my statistical analysis, the following question 
is pertinent: is there no variable which influences the distribution of grants 
for regional revitalisation policies other than finance trends and social 
and economic trends in local municipalities? The influence of employees 
assigned from central government ministries and agencies to local 
municipalities may be another variable which affects the distribution 
of grants. This issue must be pursued in future research. 
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